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RESPECTIVE RIGHTS OF PREFERRED AND' COMMON
STOCKHOLDERS IN SURPLUS PROFITS

THE movement in _the field .of cooperative commercial

und~

takings has been; 5chool-bQok-like, a movement from the simple to the complex, from the common-IaW: sit..iation of persons associating together to c9nduct .a busi.n~~ for pi:ofit to the modern statU. tory association and the corppration pqss~sing .an. enormous capital
.cterlved from a hQSt of individuals .whose rcSpective interests.
repre&ented by ·various 'Classes -of· tram.feral>le s~e5.
Of course, the real incentive of the·individuat -member of ·such a
groµp -is fo share in the· increased profits sec:Urcd .. by ~mobilization
of Ca.pital, with the resultant efficiency o.f.the·large scale enterprise
over such sm.an· urtd~kinp as· bis- Jimited means could finance.
Usually, therefore, be seeks\~ protect his:~tercst iil tlie·ptofits.of
the concern by exp~ con.tract, bot With charact.eristic busin~
man "confident~ in the other f~Uow, be o~ten. employs very genera{
term?
relies upon trade usages· and the ~et-place sense of
fair play to cover·the details.
·
·
He is, moreover, prone to assume tliat what is law among b~incss
men in t•eir dealings with ~ch other,. and iri reliance upon which
they daily pay out targe sums of money in.purchase or ~tlement:;
is also law in the courts. Unfortdnately, the law merchant and the
~ommon btw Have never' yet been on all fours with each other, and
~r.haps ·they .never will precisely _coincide, since it. 'is the ~
'function Of the law merchant to be always reachfog OUt to COfltrot
the latest· developments in the commercial field, ·while the common
law must ~eeds await the definite crystallization of the mercantile

are

and_
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usage upon a particular point before it can in justice add its sanction.1
In this instance, however, the ~usiness view and the legal doctrine
seems to have been in accord to the extent, at least, that :both
regarded the rights of the respective classes of stockholders inter
scse as governed by the statute of incorporation, or by the contract,
expressed or implied in fact, under which the prefered stock. was
issued. 2 • It is worthy of note tpat, although for upwards of seventy
years 3 classi.fication of cqrp·orate stock has b·een a common thing~ and
the rights of the various classes with respect to each other have been
the substance of everyday bitsiness transactions in the issue and sale
of preferred and common shares ~nd payment of dhidends thereon,
yet business men have felt so confident of· the interpretation given
those rights by the generally accepted mercantile usage that resort
to the courts has been ~re indeed. ·In consequence, we find few
ca.ses even indirectly involving our subject, either in England or
America, prior to the opening years of the twentieth century.
The implied .contract of equality of shares in the simple corporate
situation with its one class of stock is now accepted as a matter ·of
course, but when our specific problem is presented with its diversified classes of stock, one having priority over another in division of
profits, capital, or otherwise, then, as we have seen, the statute or
S~e D~ Pound's address, "Commerce and Legal J'ror;ttss," delivered
before the Commercial Law League, July, 1917, in which he points out.how
commerce has in the past opened up the.path of progress for the Jaw. 28
AKWCAN Ll:GAr. ~EWS, October, 1917; Commercial Law League of America.
Bulletin 1, XXII (l!i>I7). 6o8.
.
2
Recent -cases stating this settled view are: Paterson ,.. R. Paterson 6:
Sons, Ltd. (House of Lords); 1917, 54 Scot. L. Rep. 19; Speare v. RocklandRockport Lime Company, 113 M_e. 285, .93 Att 754 (1913); In re National
Telephone CoJT!pany, (1914J I Ch. 755; Bassett v. U. S. Cast Iron Pipe &
Foundry Co., 74 N. J. Eq. fi68, 673, 70 Atl. 929 (19(6).
a Everhart v. West Chesier, etc., R. R., 28 Pa. St. 339 (1857); Henry v.
Great Northern Ry. Co., I De. G. &-J. 6o6 (1857).
See New York Act. March 29, 1848 (P. L. 238), empowering the New
.York & Harlem R. Co., to issue preferred stock; Pennsyh'ania Ar.t. March
4. 1850 (P. I,. 129), ·authorizing the Beaver Meadow Raifroad & Cc 1al Company to issue preferred stocK: v.:hich was to be entitled to preferenc-e o\·er all
other stock of said company in fu_ture dividends of profits; New Jersey General Corporation Act, March 22, l86o (P. L. 6o3), first pro,·iding ir. th:it state
for the issue of special preferred stock.
.

1
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contract creating such classification becomes the dominant factor in
detennining the respective rights of the different groups of stockholders.'
The very fact that our problem is essentially one of statutory construction and interpretation of. contracts has led .some authorities
to belittle it as a matter of .general legai i~terest,1 aod · probably
accounts for the off-hand manner in which the text-w.riters have
treated it, if, indeed, they touch upon it at all.' -On the other hand,
seldom are the courts called upon ·to decide a matter of such widespread significance to the .business world, one in which frequently
the division -of millions of dollars is at stake, and furthermore,_ we
have the statement of one of our most scholarly fe<?eral judges that
this is a field in which authoritative legal writing is much needed.'
That :we. may have a definite concq>tion of the scope of our subject, it ·must 1?e ~mphasized that this· di5cussion· is limited lo the
specific problem of the respective rights of the typical .classes of
corporate stockholders-preferred and common-in the distribµtion
of the ·surplus profits of going corporation for a particular yearl
or in the division of an. accumulated surplus of profits.1

a

'Note ::, supra, and cases discussed, infra.
• "My Lords, this appeal raises a question of great interest from a busi- .
. ness point of view, b~t it is difficult to see how it can be said to raise any
questidn of general legal interest. The point in· dispute (our very· subject)
is one of construction, and construction must always depend on the terms
-0f ·the particular instrument; it is only to a limitei extent that other cases
deei~ed upon ·different documents a~ord a!ly ·guidance." Viscou~t Haldane.
L. C., in Will v. United Lankat Plantation. Co., Ltd., (1914} ~ C. u, IS.
• VI FtEl'CHER,· CYCI;Ol'£1JIA CORPORATIONS (1919), Sec. 3755; I CooK -ON
CoRl'OltATIONS [7th ~d .. 191j), Sec. 26!); IV THOMPSON ON CORPOJlATIONa [2nd
e~ .. J!J09], Sec. J(io3; CoNYNGTON ON CollP<ilin: ORGANIZATION (1908 ed.]1 p.
70, same in edition of 1917, p. -;·II Cl.ARK AND !llARSHAU. oN: .PiuvATt
CORPORATIONS (1901), Sec. 417; TAYI.OR ON CORPORATIONS rJrd ed., 1894).
Sec. 788; I M<iRAWETZ ON PmvAn; CORPORATIONS [2nd ed., 1886], Sec. 456.
. '"'This is not the court in which it is appropriate to write.an elaborate
essay on the rights of preferred shareholders,· although the· facts prescnte'd
in this brief record (relating to division of surplus profits\ afford the opp0r•
tunity. Such an essay, if wdl done and wlth .authority, is much· needed."
~ougl1, D. )., in Niles v. Ludlow Valve Mfg. Co., 196 Fed. 994 (1912). · •·
• The authorities, generally, have made a «iistinction between a preference
in profits of a going concern and a prefeiente in capital assetS on liquidation,
holding that though stock is preferred in p~ofits that does not make it pre- .
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The question arises fro~ two g~ercil types of statutes or eon-

tracts:
·I. Those statutes·or contracts in which :the preferrea shares are
in· express terms, or by words of necessary implication, allowed or
prohibited, a5 the case may be, a further -participation in the profits
after they have received their stipulated preferential dividend.'
Sometimes the statute or contract provides in great detail for the
·rights of each class .of stockholders in the distribution of profits.
For example,. in an English case10 the company's memorandum of
association gave the preferred shares a preferencc dividend of seven
per cent and one-fifth of any surplus . profits remaining after an
equal dividend had been paid to the ordinary shares. This method
.itidicates careful and intelligent draftsmanship and is to be highly
commended,
Very often the terminology is not so definite and certain as the
above, and the courts are forced tQ resort to. the· _yarious documents
ferrcd in assets on a winding up, but it participates eqnall7 ·with the common

· stock both as to return of capital and in division of surplus assets. In re
London InC,ia Rubber CO.. L. R. S Eq. St8 ( 1868) ; Birch v. Cropper, 14 App.

v. Pennsylvania Electric Vehicle Co., 25 N~ J. Eq.
72 AtL -16· (t9CJ9).
. .
The .same has been held as to distribution of capital surplus of a going
~rporation. Jones v. Con<:ord &: Montreal R. R; 6; N. H. ng, 234 (1891).
But see In re National Telephone Co., [1914] I Ch. 755, denying to stock
preferred both as to dividends and to assets. on . a winding up, the right,
after being repaid its· par value, to participate with the common shares· in
disfribution of surplus capital assets•. Also, Michael v. Cayey-Coquas !fobacco
Co., J90 App. Div. 618, 18o N. Y. Supp. 532 (1920). Cf; In re Fraser &
Chalmers, Ltd., [1919) 2 Ch. JI4·
•A careful research indicates that every dec:i~ion relating to the right of
·the preferred stockholders to share with the i:ommon stoc:JC in '!Urplus profits
iii "exc~s of their stipulated dividend prior to 1906 was of this type.
,,. Ashbury v. Watsoit, 30 Chan. Div. 376, 54 L. J. Ch. (N•. S.) g85· (1885).
Se·e also Field v. Lamson & Goodnow"Mfg. Co., 162 Mass. 388. JS N. E. n26
(1894), where the statute (MASS. LAws· 1885, Ch. 349, Sec. 2) expressly pro'ided that the holders of preferred stock in the defendant corporation should
"be entitled to .all the privileges of .other members of said corporation.
inc;luding the right to vote upon such stock," and the rights of the prefernd
stock issued thereunder were very definitely stated, inter alic; "to share pro
rota with the holders of the common stock in any cxcei:s divided in any year
abo\'e a divid~d on .the i.rhole stock of sai(i company at said rate of six per
~ 525" (1889); Lloyd

~3.

cent."
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·uP

making
the contract ·retatirig to the J>Jrtitular istOck. issue and~
. purposes· ~ ·were designed to serve in order ·to determine ..the
rights of tlie respective group& of stockholders. In !Jaikyv~· H•
11ibal & St. J oieph R. Co.p the preferred stock certificate .stated
.that the holder was.entitled to a prefer~ce in profi~ "up to$;~
share~' in each year, "and ta shat"e in any surplus beyond $7 per
share which may be divided.upon the "common stock." A dividend
of seven per cent having .been declared on the. preferred and tJµ:ee
and a half per cent on the common, a preferred ibarcholder sought
. to share equally with the common in this fund, but the .court looked
back to the plan of r~organizatk>n under which .the bondholders sur-.
rendered their bonds for ,said preferred stock, -and .found that it
specifically provided that said stock was "to share with ~e commOn
stpck any surplu~ which may be earn~ over and above 7 per CC?t
upon both in any ~e year," and dismissed the. s~t.
·
. Also, in the well-known case of Gordon's E_.i-ecutors·v•. Richm<md,
etc., R. Co.,12 the resolution under which the preferred stock-~
issued provided that it should .be entitled to share in all .dividends
paid on the common in excess of the preferred dividend. and the
court a~cordingly admitted it to participate with the comnion in a
script dividend representing accumulated profits used for betterments.
·
Then there are the opposite cases under this ~ypc in· whilh the
statute or costract prohibited any further sharing. of surplus profits
by the prefc;rred stock after payment of the preferential diVidcnd.
One such
involved the c~tti'ng of an eighty-million-dollar "melon" of accumulated surplus profits, and the common stock took it all
under a clause of the articles of association which, after providing
for the stipufated preferred dividend. added, "b~t to no .other or
further shate of the profits.~
These ·cases tum on well-S«:ttltd legal principlei;, and perhaps their
chief value to the lawyer is to impress upon him the importance <»f
specifically covering this problem. in drafting the vari~us corporate

case

~84 U •. S. (17 WalLj g6 (1872).
:o ;8

Va. 501 (1884).
' " Eqllitable Life Assurance Society v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 212 "N. Y.
36o, to6 N."E. 92 (1914); also, Rus~cn v. American
!: Electric Co.. 152
App. Dh·. '(N. V.) 1;36. ~36 N. Y. Supp. 6o2 (t9u).

Gu
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papers relating ~o the classification of.the stock,H for, as we have
seen, once the cOuns discov~r explicit coniractual provisions they
w~ll -C.'lforcc th~ irrespective of the huge sums involved. They
also teach a .very practical lesson· td both the lawyer· and business
that the plJrchaser of preferred stock caqnot always "depend
upon the j>urported definition of his rights "in the stock certificate,
but in the abundance of. preeaution ~hould check up with the other
documents which together contain ih~ contract "governing that stotk

man:

it

issue."

·

·

The other ·type of ·statute or contract might be termed the short
· ~r mei:cantile form, and may be described as:
-II. Those statutes or contracts providing fQr preferred shares
entitled to a specified pre!erential dividend before anything is paid
to the cominon stock, but containing no. provision whatever r~pcct
ing its right to share in any surplus· profits i~ excess of the stipulated dividend. · ·
·
·
.

.

. It is this second. type that presents the r~ legal problem in solving the respective rights of preferr(d and common stockholders in
surpJu~ profits. Strangely enough, we have but a judicial dict1m1
or two from the last centUty,18 and in fact the question
to
have been first directtx broached in Anglo-American law in lgGl,
in the leading case of Scott v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co.11· That case,
li~Y-:ever, as ~ctuatly decided was of Type I, and it has derived its
-0utstanding importance from the dictrtm rather than ~he decision

seems

,.. See suggested form in PALKat's CoxPAlf\" ~mrs... Part I (nth
ed., 1912], p. l~o6, Form 464 d seq.; V Coo:tc ON Co11PORA~10Ns (7th ed., 1913},
p. 4044.
• ~t is agreed tfµlt the terms of these contracts arc to be gath.ered frorp
the articles. of incorporation or memorandum of a.~sociation. the by-laws,
minutes of corporate meetings, resolutions of the stockholders and directors,
propositions or repc)rts to the company, and agreements,. conveyances, etc.,
pertaining to the issue of the stock. in question, and classes- having a preference over it. ·sic I CooK ON: CoRPORA'l'IONS [6th ed., 1go8J:
26g.
" In re Bridgewater Navigation Co.,. 39- Ch..- Div. 1, 1J, 13 ( 1888) ; North.
J.; mrch v. Cropper, 14 App. Cas.
531 (1889),_ Lord Herschell;- In Tc
.Bridgewater Navigation C"o., [1891] 2 Ch. 317, Lindley, L J.. where profits
set a1iart by dircclors for depreciation, insura~ and improvements were
held mi a winding tip tu go to ordinary ~narebolders excl11sively, although
tllcm. were preferred shares entitled to a prcfermtial divi~ of iive _pt'r cenL
"93 :Md. 475, 49 Atl. 3ZJ- (1901). ..
.

·sec.

sis.
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upon the point before us. It appeared that in the .i-eorganization of
the railroad company preferred stock was issued which was enti_tlcd
to an annual non-cumulative dividend "up to, but not exceeding four
per centuus bef9rc any dividend shall be
apart or paid upmi the
common stock." A preferred stockholder who had received his stipulated dividend sought to participate upon an equal footing with the
common stock in the division of the remaining annual profits. The
court denied his cl~ on the gro~d that the words "not exceeding"
were words of limi~tion, measuring the maximum tights- of the
preferred shareholders in distn"bution of profits.11
· Our problem as presented und~ Type II might conceivably be
solved in any one o.f three ways:
(I} Aftcr payment of the agree preferential dividend any bat·
ance of profits be divided ·pari-:passi' among both the preferred and
common shares. · ·
(2) Upon paymenl of the designated preferred dividend, a like
annual dividend be paid to the common stock any profits remaining
to·be divided e<iually among both the preferred and common shareholders.
(3) When the preference. dlVidend specified has ~n fully paid,
the entire .residue of the profits to go exclusively to the conunon
stock. .
·
To date no court has adopted the first of this triology of possible solutions· as applied to the Type lI situation, the conflict of the
cases having centered about the respective; merits of. the second and
third views.
.
·
For a concise statement of the legal situation as it existed in 1901
with respect to cases of Type II, we cannot do better than quote the
~\·ords of Page, J., in. Scott v. Baltimore" & Ohio R. Co.~1 ·(p. 502):

set

a

"Whatever courts may hold eventually as•to the right of
ordinary .preferred stocJcff share in the residue of net earn-

to

"s~mble St. John .v. Eric l\:tilway -Co., 8g
(18j4), Swayne,

J.

•See note 17. ntra.

ti.

S. (22 Wall.) 136, 141

.

•The suggested distinction between "'ordinary prcff'1 red stock." that is,
preferred stock issued simultane-0usly with the common stock or in ordinary
course of the corporate existence, as distinguished from such stock issued
in a reorganization adjustmmt, seems unsound in principle, and has not hem
adopted in later cases.
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ings after its prderred dividend has been received, the inaintenance of that right, in the absence of anything in the contract creating such preferred stock, so far as we are informed,
has not yet been taken by any court. No decision holding
this has been f u~ished tis by the very able and industrious
counsel21 who argued this case for the appellant, and we have
'found none. ourSetves; ·It is true that some text-writers!!: do
intimate that such
be ·th~ ~w. b1;1t tlie cases cited ·a.re
those where ther~ is express p,rovision for the participation
in the surplus, and fall far short of sustaining the proposition by .which the appe11ants here seek to impose the additioniu quality on tf:te preferred stock. * * * So tha~ there is
romn here for the argument that in declaring the rights
of the. p~erred stocl( it was not ·necessary to state particu:
_larly that it shot_tld have such attributes, because of the reas0n
that unde.rwell-settled principle~ of Jaw it is entitled pi'oprio
fligore 1o such participation.''
·

sfiay

no

1be seCoDd 04 theoretical conception, howevet, SUCl".Ceded in getto a running start; in spite of the fact that the third solution seems to hav.e been the. original and generally .accepted. under~
stan'ding in business and financial circtes.
.
·Thus,
1906, in the very first decision of our problem undt-.T
T)1pe II .in Anglo-Americ~ui law_,
find the Pennsylv~nia sµpreme
Court,- in Fidelit~.".Trtt.sl·:CP. ~: .L~l:righ Valley R. C.o.,2: ili;>holding
~ away

m

we

*The most ·brilliant torporaff~: Jawyers ·or the time appeared in this

c:ase"(ifs,,,. •~>.John(;.. Jo~son. Esq., of Philadelphia, Pa., for the: appelhht~( William D.- Guthrie, Esq., of. New .York City, for the appcllee, and
Victor Mora'l\'.ctz, Esq~·.or New York City, for certain voting trusttts.
•See I CooK ·o!'i Co11PORATIONS [4th ed., 1898). Sec. 26s>: ''It seems that

unless ·the contra~t expressly. provides otherwise. prMerred stockholders participate in the surplus profits _remaining after the p;oper dividend has been
declared on the ·preferred. and an equat dividend on the common stock...
This statement is t)'pical of most of the text-books of the day; 'Cf., the more
conservative statement of TAYLO!t .ON PR1V.\Tt CoaroRATIONS· (3rd ed•• 1891).
Sec. 788: "Aside. froin cotrsiderations arising from the· cin:umstance that
iiart of the· shares are. prc(erred, or .that a part ;i:rc .more- fully paid up than
ott.fs, every ~llar-eh~1der is ·e-ntitled. both. in the distribution of profits and
·o.i 't!ie winding up of . the corj>oration, to participate in proportion to the
number of shares· held by· him."
·
·
• a15 Pa. 610, 64 Atl. 629 (1906).
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the· right of the preferred stock.to share .Pro rata with the common
in ih~ distribUtion:of surplus.profits remaining after· payment o.f the
stipulated preference dividend,. and a like ·annqal.divi9.end upon the
common stOck. There the ,statute under which the "preferred shares
were issued mere,Y provided that they ·showd be entitled to a dividend of ten per cent per annum before _the oth~r sto~'of the~
pany·· ~oul4 ·participate in any further distributie~ of its profitS.
Long J)efore; th:C company had
three prosperous years· paid an
e~tra..dividend of ten per cent·uJ>OD· b:oth flle preferred a.nd common
.stock aft~r pay~nt of th~ pr.cferential _aividend -and an eq~ dividend upon the common shai:es. : The common stockholders claimed
.1hese extra dividends .shoitl4 be.treat~d as advance payment- of
stip~lated preferred d~yid~.n!l, .and.-should, ·therefore; ·be deducted
.from arrearages du~ to jlr.efeired $tock1iold~· for unp~id"dividends.
The court, howev¢r, .deniea· ihe ·contention· on the grciurid that th~
statute fixed 110 Jinlitati~- -on the rights of "the .p.ref~~d ·stoc}c .in
gi'anting it a fixed preferencc··in diyiden~~.:"but 1vJten each class
of :Stock had been· ·paid· tcD: .J>:Cr cent. ~hey ·w~re equal and equally
entitled to partake el whatever .r-emained in .the_ .fu~d applicable .for
dividend:purposesf' ~o::~ut~orities were Qtcd·by the <;0urt in reaching "this decision. Perhaps the result maY be supported upon the
assumption, as appears in the case, that the -two classes of. stOckholders· lntei-estcd liad adoP,ted a pradical . interpretation of· the
statute ..respecting
rightS by .acquiescing without obj~on in
·tlµit·.method Of "distnoutijig ~e·sJHi>lus pfQfi~ . ·
· ·By a -coincidence. the n~t·case under Type II, ~d.the one whiCb
bas. bC~oriie .the foremost. c:fuml~n for -the sec<:>nd solution,. a1so
. aros~ in .Penmiylvania. This was Sternbergh v .. Brock," in ~909"·.
· Th·~ "contra~ .under whlch-lhe preferred stock wa,s i~sued provided
· that it should· "receive ·a.cumulative yearly dividend.of five per cent,
paya:ble ·q~rterly * * * .before any divjden,d sh.all be set apart or
paid on the common stock," and· the· court held that the· pre.ferr.cd
shareholders were entitled to:sbare pro rata with the common ·stoclc
ill ~utplus profits in .ex~ess of the preferential dividend and a· dividehd at- an equal rate per cettt upon the. common shares. · The distribution ·o{ gn eight per cent .dividend among the common stock-:liolders ·was,. th~refor~ .eilj6irted_ so far.as r~l;;lted to·.the amount in

in

the

their

"225 Pa. 279, 14 Atl. .166 (1909).
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excess of five per cent. The fact that the common stock dividends
had been eighteen per cent upon the :unount actually paid in thereon
was rejected as a practical interpretation by the parties on the ground
that it was immaterial since these dividends amounted to but two
per cent of the par value of said stoqc. In reaching its decision the
court declared there was no ambiguity in the contract, and laid down
the broad ruie (p. 286) :
"WhP.re there is no stipulation in the ~ontract to the contrary, the weight ·of authority clearly fa\)ors the right of pre·.ferred stockholders to share with the- common stockholders
in all profits distribut~d, after the latter have received an
amount equal to the stipulated dividend .on the preferred
stock."
•
In view of the fact that at this time the entire "weight of authority" in the whole field of Anglo-American law was l>ut its own decision in the Fidelity Trust case three years previously, opposed to
which, as we have seen, wa5 the strong .dictum in Scott v. Baltimo,·e
& Ohio R. Co., one is tempted to wonder whether this statement
may not have been used as a judicial smoke-cloud. Probably the
true explanation is that although the court cites only its own prior
decision and 'the opinions of several text-writer~ for this new doctrine; it had in mind in using that expression the language of the
treatises, a majority of which did support this doctrine.21
Such was the condition of the law in 1912 when the question again
came up in America-this time in the federal courts-and was ·atso
first presented· for decision to the English j~tdges. In the American
case, Niles v. Ludlo:zu Valve Mfg. Co.,:G a New Jersey corporation.
had an accumulated surplus of profits amounting to half a million
dollars, and the preferred stock having been paid its stipulated preference dividends in full, the directors voted to distribute '><lid surplus exclusively to the common stock, whereupon a preferred shareholder brought suit, claiming the ·right to participate equally with
the c9mmon stock in1 said distribution fifter that stock had received
an antJual dividend equivalent to the preferred dividend. Under
• See notes 6 and

22, 4fltra.
• 196 Fed. 994 (D. C.,. S. D., N. Y.) (1912).
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the New Jer.sey corporation laws in force when the corporation was
formed, the preferred stock was to be entitled "to a fixed yearly
dividend" to be stated· in the certificate of incorporation. lo this
instance the certificate of incorporation provided that the preferred
shares should "receive interest or dividends of 8 per cent per annum
and bc27 preferred as to capital as well as dividends,''. while the stock
certificates simply stated an agreement to pay "to the holde~ of this
stock a yearly dividend of 8 per cent. * * *" The United States District Court neid that the preferred st~k had no n~t to participate
in the distribution of these accumulated surplus profits, -but, on the
contrary, that the entire amount be~onged exc~usively to ·the common · stoCkholdcrs.
·
·
This decision was 'affirmed in the Circuit Court of Appeals.~
Both courts laid much stress upon the practieal con~ruction of the
contract by the p~ies theniselve5 as ev.incing their intention. with
regard to their .respective rights as preferred and comi:non stockholderss The evidence showed that
twenty years _the corpora~
rin:n had paid the stipulated prefcrential divi den~~ and in nearly
every year had also paid greater dividends to the comman stock;
tJlat, in fact~ for nine years the common dividend bad 1>ccn approximately double the preferred.
· ·
'
. The ratio decidendi of ·the ease was thus cxpress:ed by Coxe, J.,
in the Circuit Court of Appeals (p. i43):
·

for

"lt has been sought tp distinguish this case because of 'the prescµce of
the word "interest" (I .COOK ON CORPORATIONS [7th ed.. 1913}, Sec. 269, note
3), but as the statute' merely referred to a "yearly dividend," the word seems
to have no special significance. In NcW Jersey, Ohio, and sever.fl other states,
however, the issue of ·preferred stock is assimilated to the making of. a
secured loan, thus: (a} the dividend rate· may not exceed a prescribed.maximum (eight per cent, which in Ohio is also the legit maximum for interest) ;
(b) the amount of preferred stOclc which may be issued is limited and
gauged like that of corporate bonds proportionately to the actual paid in
capital (usuaily two-thirds); -and (c) provision is made for redemption of
preferred stock at par, with accrued dividend. This would seem to- import
·a legislative recognition that the stipulated dividend per cent sets both a
maximum and a minimum to •the rights of the preferred stockholders in
surplus profits. The point' Was not made in the principal case. N. J. G!?f'r.
Cinu>. I.Aw, §§ 18, 149; OHIO GtN'I. Cont, §§ 8667, 8668, 8669. .
• 120 C. C. A. 31g, 202 Fed. 141 (1913) • .Ward, J.; dissented in favor
of the second or·Pennsy!vania view.
·
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"The common shareholders bear substantially all the losses
of adversity and are entitled to the gains of prosperity. A
contract. that they should assume all the risk with no correspon_ding advantage should be clearly established. We find
nothing in the law or the ccrtifi~tes or in the past action of
the defendadt. (the corporation) to indicate that anyone connected with the business supposed that the preferred stockholders were to share equally with the eommon stockholders
in the division of. surplus earnings."
The· English case, u.nique· as one of .-the· fir5t impression in thosc>
long ~stablis~ed courts, was that of Wil_l v. United Lankat- Plantations Co.,. f.td. 9 : By ·the articles of association the defendant corperation was authorized to issue preferred shares and to fut their
prefer~ce pr priority; ·Accor!lingly; the resolution attthoijzing the
issue of the preferred stock provided that it should ..be entitled to
a cutnul~tjye preferent~al ·dividend at the rate ~f ten per· cent per
annum * * and to .rank both as regards capital and dividends in
priority to. the other shares~" ·The com~y, which was chiefly
engaged. in tobacco cultivation. in Sumatra,. sold the·nibber J;>rancli
of its busine5s. for £30,0CXJ ~d 45,900 fully paid· shares of £t each
·in ~ new compapy,. and tl:ie stipufated preferred· dividend having
~- paid in· full, atlotted the 45~000 shares to the ·common $lode·holders·. exclusively. A prefei:fed stockholder .bcgati. suit" to have
said-. distribution declared illegal; and to obtain a declaration that the
preferred shares were entitled to rank for. ~videpd pari pcu$u in
any profits· of the.company available for distribution after providing·
for .the cumulative prefer~ial dividend of ten per ~ent' per annum
and .an equal dividend on· the ordinary 'shares•
. In tlie Chancery Division. Joyce, J.L made· the declaration sought,
basing his decision upon his in,terpretation of a section of the articles
of association w~ich read:

*

·"Subject 'to any prioritie~ that may. be·given upon :the issue

o.f any. ttew shcires, the profits of the company .ilvaitable for.
distribution.* * * shati lie distributed as dividend among the
members in accordan~e.with the amoun'ts paid on the shares

.

held. by them
~espectively~"
.

.• io6 L. T. Rep. (N." S.)
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The judge thus stated his·position·.(p. 533):

"In ~y opinfon, wh~ you. look· at the thing calmly an~.
fairly, the right of·priority· given to the preference ~lass is
. the right to be. paid ten· per c~nt, at least •in respect o:f the
current year, and in.respect of past.years, a~d subject to that
right, the profi~1lrc to be divided am<_ltlg~t Jxtth c~es according t~ thc·amount paid lipon thrir shares.""
Although pressed Wjtjr tlic admitted fact that the pre~errcd had.
never received mote tQan the ~ed dividend, .while. much··larger
dividends had been. from ~me to time :paid -on the ordinary shares,
the court refllsed to con5ider· that pi:actical interpretation of thei~
rights. by the parties ~- ma~rial ih the face: of ."its. O'!iYn construct~6n.
of the cantraci ~~ other words. the decision hete ~ almo~ iden~
tical with. the earli.et PennSy~vania deciiioil in the.Sternbergh .caSe,
although t~at ~e was not clted:to·or _bt·this· tQuft.,
· The·Co~l't of.Appcals,11 howev.tr unanimousIY. reversed·thi ~
cery -l?i~sion, 'aild expr~sly held; iii accord. with "the thim" or.· mer~
can~le view, t}Jat, i!t· the ·absetice ef any provisiOn ·to. :the t:Pntrary. -ill
the st~tute or contract \lJldcr whi~ the pre"i~ed shilr~ wcte:i~sued,,
they are etitltled tO. their -stipufated diyidend onJy; ·artct-tO .n~ other
share irr the surplu5 profits. atJeast. While.the·co~ratibt:t is:a going
concern. On appea), the Ho~ of Lords -Unaitirriously affinncd this
decision3~ on the ground that, :as a matter of intMpretati90 o~ ~e
Type IL.statute- or eontract, tlie thmI solution was cdrrect arut· the·
second erroneous.
.
.. .
.
.
Thus, befoi'e the end the.year 191-4·the practical Vi~w had.O\ifr." taken the theoretical s~Jntion. ana ~ted from .it the w~ight cf
authority. · $i~e thCµ the second'Vieytr bas been"twice reaffirmed in
the. state Qf its nativity~Pennsyl~a"-while the ~hint method

of

•Tliis;Janguage of the. learned judge wouid suppgrt the. first~. bUt
his .,Iecision di~ not go 1hat far•.
a (1912] 2 Ch. 57i, IC1J· L T. R~ (N. S.) .3(io.
a {J9l4T A. C. it; 83 L: J. Ch. (N. SJ 1gs, 109 L T. Rep. (N. S.). 7S4a Stirling..v. H. F. Watson Co.. 24f. Pa. 105, 88 AtL ~ (tg13).: There
the preferred stOck was entitled to a ·~ulative semi-annual diviacnd of
four per- cent, and w~ subject to retirement updn paYmcnt of the par
and all arrears of dividends: The company undertook to retire the preferred
·stoclc by deducting from arrear-ages of dividends a twenty-five per cent st~

valae

MICHIGAN

uw_ RBYIBW

was approved and followed in 1917, in an unreported case, by a ftderal court sitting in that state.11 and during the autumn of 1920 the
Supreme Court of Maine add~ its support."
So much for the state of the authorities. Let us now consider
dividend which had been distn'buted equally ·to preferred and common. but
the court held said dividend could not be charged agahist the back dividends
as commo~ and preferred, after each bas received an ~ual dividend, have
the "right fo participate in the distribution of surplus earnings upon an
equal basis.n
In Englai:ader v. Osb:orne. a6i Pa. 366, 104 Atl 614 (1918), (also 6 A. L.
R. 8oo and note), the Pennsylvania court settled a. t!oubtful point raised
by the broad language of the rule laid down in the Sternbergb case, and
not decided in the . Sterling case, viz.: must the COJpmon stock, after pay•
ment of the preferred · dividends in full, be paid past omitted dividends
equal to all th_e preferred had received, or only that particular year's dividend
to the same amount as the annual preferential dividend? It was held that
the common shares were only entitled to an equivalent dividend for the current year a!icl not to be reimbursed for 'Wle"amed dividends .in past yean;
therefore, the preferred stockholders were entitled to share tro rota with
the commori stock in all profits distributed after the latter have received in
any year an amount equal to the stipulated divic!end on the preferred stock.
Notice this leaves open~ question of the right of the ·common stockbolden
to profits in excess of the preferred dividend retained from year to year for
depreciation, ~nqents and improvements. For a criticism of this case.
see 3 MINN. LAw R!v. 6s (Dec. 1918)•
.. Keith v. Carbon Steel Co•.(U. S. D. C., W. D. Pa.), Orr, D. J. Opinion denying · preliminary injunction filed April '30. ig17; apinion on final
bearing filed August, 1917. In that case th~ holder of preferred non-cumulative six per cent stock, who had received the preference dividend in fuli;
brought suit to ,restrain the corporation from paying accumulated earnings
amounting to nearly one-half ~f its entire capital exclusively to the common
stock, but the court rejected the Pennsylvania doctrine, ·and adopted the
third view' both. as a matter of principle and upon authority of the Nites case
and the En.slish decisions.
·
•Stone v. U. ~· Envelope Co., - Me. -,. 111 Atl. 536 (192()), Deasy. J.
A common stockholder sought to restrain the corporation from distn'butinl'
equally between the common and preferrtd shares • stodc dividend represonting an accumulated surplus of earnings which the directors in their discretion had retained and employed for betterments and improvements, claiming that as the preferred had been paid in full, its stipulated annual dividend
of seven per cent, all remaining profits belonged solely to the common. The
court upheld this contention, placing its decision expressly uposi the third
or mercanb1e doctrine. Semble: Bassett v. U. S. Cast Iron Foundry Co.;
15 N. ]. Eq. 539. 541, 13 AtL 514 (1909).
.
0
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the matter on principl~. Which of the· various criteria suggested
should be accorded legal sanction. or rather, which of the conceivable solutions of this Type II phase of our probletn best combines
the support of legal principle5, and adaptation to the actualities of
the commercial. field in which it is to operate-, so thllt it most nearly
attains actual justice ~.the concrete ~?
We may summarily dismiss the first view, for, as. pointed out, it
h;ls' never found f~vor ~ither in the courts or among business meiL
T~e question. is thereby narrowed to an issue between our second
and third. suggested solutions. .
Th~ Pennsylvariia second criterion is based upo~ the very plauSible argument of many text7writers that "a share of stock is a share
·of stock, wheth~r ·preferred or common."" The underlying theory
is that sinte in the simple corporate ·situation with one class of stock
all shares are eq~, classification of the stock into preferred and
common docs not displace this basic equali~, but to the. extent of
the preferencc amplifi~ the rights of the preferred stock, therefore,
iti the. absence of .distinctly restrictive provisions, the preferred stockh'olders possess all the rights of common stockholders, an.d in addition their own special advantages.'' ·we find this idea well expressed
in the dissenting opinion of Ward, J., in Niles v. Ludlow Yalve Mfg•
Co.," (p. 144) :
. .
.

or

."The general principle is ·that all stockholders share cquatly
·in net profits, except as th~ir relations are alterCd by statute
or c~ntract. If a preferencc is given to one class of stOck~olders over the rest, it shou14 be construed consistently with
this general principle as far as possible. For instance, if the
preferred. stockholders arc given· the right to receive a dividend of a fixed amount before the cominon stockholders get
· anything, the latter should next receive an equal amount, and
then the surplus, if ~y, be equally divided between the preferred and eommon stockholders. Where the privilege is
•See I Coox ON CoJIPOilATioNS [Sth ed., 1902, and subsequent editions],
the the<>retic:all7 and logi~ly correct principle, in spite of the mercantile view-10
the contrary. This view seems to be fundamentally a syllogism.
• Stembergh v. Brock, and other Penn51lvania cases (ntre).
•In S. Circuit Co~rt of Appeals, 211l Circuit, 202 Ffd. 141 (1913).

Sec. 259, where the learned anthor in a footnote advocates this

v.
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intended to be restrictive, the intention sholl;ld be _expressed~
as by saying that the preferr~ stockholders are-to be paid a
certain dividend before the common stockholders get anv~
thing, and are to receive nothing more."
There is also som~hat of legal analogy in support·of this view:~
For example, although· apparently nQt ciilled to the attention of tjle
~ennsylvania court, the bas~ principle of 'its d~trlnc. had been previously. enunciated and applied by-the courts in 'the clos~ly analogous.
situation of the respective rights of stockholders, whether preferr:ed
or· deferred.as to profits, tO share i~ a distnlnrtion of capital. In
~e leading case of Jones v. Concord~ Montreal R.R.," Doe, C. J:,
relying upon the simple concept that a share of stock is a share of
stock, ,no matter what adjective is attach~ to it, ailowed all classifications of stock ~o share pro rata in a stock dividend distributing
~ capital surplus.41
·
This iundamental premise
the cq~ty of ci>rporate shares
which constitute5 the hea~ anct substance of the second view, wu
accep~ by the text-writers gen~·rauy and by the Penilsylvania.
Supreme Court as aXiODJatic,'= but in ~he later case of Will .v. U11it.ed
Lanllat · Plantation ·co., Ltd.," the English. judges ·vigorously

of

•0ne naturally thinki of the oft-repeated Statements of. the tut-writers
that wbeJ:e S~ ~ giV.~ a .preferen~aJ' ifividend, DO~ being Aid IS to
wbetliedt "is tO be· tmnulative or. n~ulathre. it shall be deemed· to· b6
cumutati~e, and that prefe~.. stOck,· in :tlie ahscnce·~f tito.Y.iiion to the 'contraf7, possesses tq~· votifJg pciwu .,,itli: the· c9m;mon, but· tbe.- cases do .not
~r-ottt ~ ~roacJ p~.
•67 N. H. ·;1191"(181}1)~ and otheT" ~-cited"• ntite'_;, -npr;.
-~It s}lotild be noted, however; that on a rehearing (liz N'. H. 234) h892l
iru; court" (lmc· Smith, J.). .!pecific:ally· distinguished l>11I' problem, pointing
oui· (p. 241) that it did not appea:: what the ·corporation had earned, 'or what
division had J>een made .of its ea~ings; therefore. "The facts stated in the
case do not show that •1he proposed" issue. o~ new stock is a dividend· of earnings (belonging to different classes of stockholders), or a violation of any
provision of the contract. of unioti (under which the various shares were
issued) relating to dividends." Also, In re Bridgewater Navigation Co.,
[1891] 2 Ch. 317, whef'e profits reserved for depreciation and similar ·purposes were siven exclusively to -th~ ordinary shareholders and not distributed /'o rattJ to the preferred shares on the winding up of the company as
were· the capital assets.
•See nOte ~ N#..
'*See note 32. ~
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denounced this hypothesis a5 untrue. Speaking on this point in the
House of Lords. Viscount Haldane, Lord Chancellor; said ( p. ~7) :

"I think that Lord Justice Farwell called attention to what
is really a cardiruil consideration in this matter. Shares are
not issue~ in the abstract and priorities then attachec\ to
them; the issue of s~s and the attachment of priorities
proceed uno flalu; and when you tum to the terms on which
the shares are issued you ~ct to find all the rights as
'i'cgards dividends specified jn t.'le .terins of the issue. And
when.yqu do. find these things prescnl>ed it certainly apj,ears
to me unnatural to go beyond them, and look to ·the ~neral
provisions of an article which is only to apply if nothing
dllfemit is said" (i. e.. no priorities speci(ied)_.
The third ~lution has been a~opte6 by ¢ier courts as an ex eption to the general principle of equality of-shares. For instance, in
the vefy lat~st ~se~ the Maine Supreme Court said:
'!We put the decision. however, upon .the ground that,
where· nothing to the contrary appears, the cteation of prefe::red stock prima fade implies that the pr~f~tial rights
of the stockholder are given in ·lieu of and to. the .exclusion
of the :equality in participati9n which would otherwise elrist...

Tb,. maxim. "&pressio 11nius est exclfUio allerius,"n is ftt-·
quC?tlY made the basis for the third solution. The reasons wh~
lead the"courts to resoit to this old maxim on the. point before us
are well stated by Orr, D. J., in Keith v. CarbOJS Steel Co.," where,
in denying to a preferred stoclc~old;.. who had been paid in ~ull a.
preli~inary inj~ction restraining distribution of an remaining
profits to the common stock, he .said:
"The holders· .~f the preferred stock must be deemed to
have .)>een unwilling' to take the same risks as "the holders of
the common stock were willing to take. In other woros, they
were not willing to take their certificates with6ut an e.xprcs.. Stone v. U. S. Envelope Co., - Ye. -.
• BJioox!s L!:cAt. Y.uni:n. p. 651.
,. See note 34. ntra.
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sion therein of the amount which they were entitled, respectively, to receive out of the profits~ * * * We are unable to
see why, in contracts sue}\ as these ~fore us, .th~ expression
of the amount to be received under the contract should not
be deemed tO be an exclusion from the minds of the parties
of any additional amount. •· * * A certificate of stock does
-not ·ordinarily e.rpress the share of profits which a stockholder shall receive· from the corporation, and therefore the
law s1nplies a term. in the agreement that the holder of such
.~ertificates shall share equally in the profits set apart by the
tnanagement for .the payment· of dividends. There can be
no ·implicatipn, however, where ~e contract expressly states
the percentage which the. one contracting party is to reeeive
from another."~'

The courts adopting the third view have also relied much upc:in
the long-established canon of construction that in the interpretattOn
of obscute statutes and contracts the legislature or th~ parties, as
the case may be, must be pr~sumed to intend that which is reasonable under the circumstances." Applying this reasonable construction to our· specific question,- these courts argue· that it is highly
unreasonable that the common
stock should bear .·substantially all .
''When you find-Qs you find here-the word 'dividend' used in the.
expression is used in the resolution and defined to be ...
~ulative Preferential dividend,' you have $9mething so definitefy pointed
to as to suggest that it contains the whole of what a shareholder is to. took
to from the a;mipany.'~ Viscount Haldane, L. c.. in Will v. United Lanbt
Plantation Co.. Ltd., (1914] A. C•. n, 18.
In Stone v. u. s. Envelope Co., - Me. -. III Atl. s36. S.V (1020).
Deasy, J.: "The maxim, 'Erpressio smitU,' etc., appli6 to this case and is
decisive. The parties bY. a contract embodied in the by-laws have provided
for. the preferred stockholders a seven per cent preferential dividend and in
case of liquidation one hundred per ~mt. This excludes other participation.''
Cf. In re National Telephone. Co.; (1914] I Ch. 755. holding where ~
preferred stock was expressly given a priority ?n repayment of assds on· a
windi~g up, that was Prima f
a defuiition of. the whole of their rights in
this respect; therefore, they could not share· with the common in the distribution -of surplus assets.
•I BtACKSTONE's Co1'Ul£NT.\U£S 61, concerning -the interpreta~ion of
Jaws, subdiv. S.
a

way
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the losses of the lean years and let the protected preferred stock
enjoy fro rota ~he results of the prosperous yea~; "that "~· con~ct
they should assume alf the risk with ·no ·corresponding advantage
should be clearly cstablished."4-• The de facto basis of this rea5oning
"is·thus pointed out by Orr,J.:"
"It is a- matter of common expericn!=e t~t ai the inccpfion
of the business of a corporation ~ returns from such ·business will be uncertaia.. Becalise there may: ntit be sufficient
earnitJgS which may be distributed tO all the stock; yet sufficient ·for part thereof~ classificatiQns of such stock are undertaken to lltduce subscriptions to the ·eapital stock. Investors
who desire mot·e certain~ With respect to ~cir returns are
more inclin~ to ·subscn1>e ·for. sha,rc5 which are preferred
over other shares in
distnl)ution of eaniings. -Those
stOckholders who are content ·that those .who desire immediate rctums.$hould have thc"prefcrrcd·s~ock,_ and who themselves are willing to wait until the earflings ·become great
.enough to give tli~.praper returns, arc content to take com. ~ stock..·· It is not reasonable to supp<>se that the commDD
stockholders \vould at· once have· the same share .in the eami
ings ~-the pr~ferred stOckholders,. and it is not reasonable.
to suppose: it was ever ~ontemplated that they shp.uld, because
the ~alders ~f the preferred $toclc have stipula~ed f f?r the
amount of dividend that they. should receive•.The classification .of. the:stock of ~efendant company "was by the. sharehold-

the

~

TJie

··• •"

JearnCd jutlge concludes by quoting·the !! !cment of Coxe, J.,
:in Niles Y. Ludlow Valve Mfgr· Co.1 tl_lat "The c:cmmon st"oekholdcrs
bear substantially all the losses· of adversity and are e~titled to the
gains of PfOSperity."
..
.
While the result of Will v. United Lankal PlantationsCo.1 ·Ltd.l1 ·
was·the rejection of the second ·view and the definite adoption of
·1he .third so1ulion!by the couits oi England, yet there is a mast sig-

· •eoxe, J.. ·in.Nites v. Ludlow Valve Mfg. Co.. 202 Ftd. r4r, at 10.
• ~ nOte 34. nslf'o.

. •Sec

not~ ·3i an~ ~
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nificant ·distinction between the ratio decidmdi of that case in the
Court of Appeal and i_n the House of Lords. ·
The opinions of the Lords make no mention of the mercantile
view as such, but they join issue with the second solution upon its
own footing as a matter of theoretical and logical construction of
the contract. This is illustrated by Viscount Haldane's declaration

(p. 17):
"You do not look outside a document of this kind in order
to sec what the bargain is; you look for it as contained within
--the four comers of the documenL,,.
·
Thus stated. the essential difference between the second and third
solutions. as a matter of pure interpretation. seems to tie in the tntth
of the hypotheses· upon which the respective views are based-that
in· the absence of express provision one way or the other, ·diversified
classes of stock are born: equal. or are in their very creation subject
to preferences or limitations.
·
Jn other words, the House of; Lords and the ~ennsylvania court
have this in common: they agree that the contract is.. not ambiguous;
hence it is to be interpreted within its four comers: and they afrlve
at this conclusion of non-ambiguity simply because each tn"bunal
assumes the infallibility of its o\vn hypothesis.11 • But it should be
noted that each hypothesis is essentially one of fact. Then how arc
we to detemune whethe: this assumption of fact is true or not'
Surely by testing it with the reality ;·yet that is precisely what both
these courts refuse to do, for by their assumption of non-ambiguity in
the contract they render inadmissible extrinsic evidence of the actualities of the business world, since, theoretically, there remains nothing
doubtful requiring eXplanation, and this in spite of the fact that the
parties have left utterly unprovided for the very situation in issue."
.. This is an excellent illustration of our tagging science of taw as pointed
out by Dean Pound: "Today, while other sciences, in the walce of the natural sciences. have abandoned dffiuctfon from pre-determined conceptions,
!'Uch is still the accepted method of jurisprudence." Law in Bdoks and uw
in Action, 44 Ax. LAW lttvlr.w 12, 25 (1r•o)
·
• Ar. Dean. Pound has said. "Tum where 01•• will, in matters of the very
fint importance to the commercial world, the Jaw of business corporation11.
the Jaw of partnership, restrictive agreements upon the sale of chattels-in
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In each instance "the postulates are taken fQr granted upon authority.
without inquiry into their worth, !Uld- then logic is used as the ·GDIJ.
tool to develop the results."H J:lcrc the authority reliea ~pqn by
the Pennsylvania court ~ the general opuiion of the text-writers.
while the House of Lords pretends to rely u~ its judicial knowledge:ll
To the harassed ·business man the opinion. of these eourts must
appear merely another exasperating example of the unfathomable
iechnicality of the law-a SC!holastic indiff~ence to the pressing
actualities of the market-place. This is the very attitude of the
judiciary which Justice Holmes so pointedly· criticized:

"We must think thfugs, not words, or at least we must ~
stantly ttanslatc our thoughts into the facts for which
11
stand, if we are to k~ to. tbe real
. and true." . ·

tbCy

.

.
.
On the other band, our l>usincss man would find no difficulty in comprehending the opinion of the Court of Appearin the Will Q!Jfe,n
for that takes cogniiance of matters wjthin ~ ~ence and
environment, and ~ressly adopts the mercantile vie\\'. Note the
pragmatic viewpoint as there set forth by the Master of the Ran.
(Cozens-H~nly) .(at p. 576):

"What is the ordinary prima farie meaning of preferenee
shares having a fixed dividend, fixed ~ this sense that it does
not vary with the pro~ "of the year, but is a fixed dividend
of 10 per ccrit ~r annwn. It seems to me that the ordi~
~~ing is that the· resolutioµ defines and limits Uic .dividend
all these cases we see precisely the same refusal to look at the sitJJ&tioa of
fact in the actual Wtirld, the same insistence upon the self-sufliciency of
abstract legal conceptio~ the same, logical developmtnt of the jnditionar
doctrine at all cost.• Address before the C0mmercial Law League, jul)- -.
1917•. 28 Ax. Lm.u. Nav~ October, 1917; Commercial ·Law LelPe of
Americ:a, BulletiD 1, XXII (1917) 6o8.
N Holmes, ]., "Law in Science and Science in Law," 12 HAnAD I.Aw
Rmtw 443. 46o. Reprinted in Holmes, "COLt!C'r£D 'l.:f:CM. PAl'DS"' (J920).
•The Lords cited no authority for· their premise,!bqt seem ti> have adopted

it

a triori.

Ii Se~ note 54, ~
• See note 31, ~
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. which a preference shareholder can take. I accept and adopt-.
·the observation of a living wri.ter whose experience in this
matter is very great (PALMER'S COllJ,"AN¥ PRECEDENTS [nth
·Ecjjt.], p. 814): 'It is geµe~ly assumed that where the preference s~ares are given a fi~ed prefercntial 9ividend at a
specified rate ~at impliedly negatives any right to take any
~urther . dividend, and probably · this ass~ption is · well
founded.' In .
..opinion, that assumption iS well founded.
* * * One cannot :be aware to any ext~nt of what goes on on.
th~ stock exchange without kno,ying t~t preferential shares
and stock are ordinarily spoken of and regar4ed, and I think
-properly regarded,_ as shares ·Of stock which carry a fixed
preferential divi~end, and are not entitled to anything more/'

my

Afte~ all, il! this ~ot primarily ~ ·business ipan's pro_blem, the very
kind ~f matter that was deait with in early English Jaw in the: eitralegal mercantile .courts,n and for which l.-9rd MaQsfield devised his
famous merchant jury? · The actuality is t}Jat w~ have here a b~Si
ness' man•s. contnct of ~ iyp~ com~nly made and dealt with .in the
on:linai-y course of -mercantil~ .t~~ction~, a· contract kiioWll .to
and interpreted by the business· world f 9r generations without once
seeking the aid of the COUrt!;-:-Clear eyidence t~at it was. founded
on a ·well-e~tablished Jaw inerch;mt. During all that. time; t~. the
general business understanding of the. respective rights of the classes
of stockholders mentioned : was dai1y published b.roadcast in~ the
stock ~change· quotations, where. th_e ·common shares of a .success£ul
corporation ~ways co~atided ..a premium.ov~r die preferred.
Notice the remark of Earl Lorebum in the Will case5~ (p. 19):
0

"My ·Lords, I ·have .no doubt m,}'self~ in· regard ·10 this part~cular resolution, that ., the people w.ho ~oo~ th_e preference
shares· llllder it knew perfectly well that they were taking
shares with a .prcferenti~l d~vidend of 10 per c~t. I think
. they would have been rathe! surprised, although no doubt
they would have been gratified; Jf_ tliey had been told that
•1 Pou.oCK
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they were about to recein the almost boundle?S additional
which have be~n held out to them in the arguments we hav~ been hearing."
·
~dvantages

But why did they not expect it. There is just one answer, since the
contract, it must be remembered, is silent on the subject: they knew
that by the established ~aw merchant they wer~ notentitled to more
than the stipula~ed p_refcrence.
Truly, we must revamp our. legal conceptions by the old ~
of the civilians, ex facto oritur jus1 recogniZing that to .hav~ a Jiving
law it must grow in mirmonyWith the.de fact.o situation.90 View~
in this way, how much more scientific, in the .sense of that ·which is
simple and in' accord witli the actualities, is the frank avowal· of the
prevailing law merchant by the English Court·of Appeal than the
artificial reasoning of the House of Lords11 and the Pennsylvania
court. It faces the realities of the problem, and siJ;nply adopts the
law merchant to give effect to what mti~. have been the tru~ but
unexpi:essed, intent of thel>arties,-business mcii .familiar with the
mercantile understanding, and,. therefore, .presumably dealing with
that es~blished inteq>retation of ~uch Contracts in mind:u
·
This triumph ·of the third or mereantt1e solution of the Type ll
~e was no mere accident; but probably our most complete example
of wholly twentieth century-made law~ True "to the master juri_stic,
thought of the time this commercial usage ~e a -rule of law, not
meicly because it fitted well .into established legal principles, bUt.
• Speakmg of this maxim, "Justice Brandeis says: -"It [the· court] realized that no Jaw, written or .Unwritten, cati be understood ·without a full
knowledge of the ·facts out of which it ·arises, .2Dd to which it is to be
applied.n "The Living Law," JO Iu.. I.Aw Rt91Ew1 ,.St, "'7 (1916) •.
•The House of Lords seems to reach the correct result· Here by the
anomalous method of adhering to "Q.Se-knife" tenninology while administering- "pick-axe" justice, as Dean Pound expresses it i" the words of Tom
Sawyer and Huck F"mn. "Law in Books and Law in Action,n 44 AK. LA.Rzmw ·r~ (1910).
~The legal consequence of the now domin;mt third view seems to be
the standardizing of the preferred stock contract,· 'l'ypc II, and the tteation
a new status-that of a preferred stockholder whose riglits are fixed bj
reason of bis position; anoth~ step in the moderp reaction Gf the ~dulum
of the law from· contract to status, suacsted by Nathan Isaacs, "Standaidizing of .Contracts," 27 YAI.lt I.Aw ]0\11.lNAi. 34. 37 {1917).
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chiefly for the reason that, being itself the product of the actualities
of the field in which it was to cperate, it promised best to function
for real justice in the every-day life.of the commtmity.ta
GEORC£ }.~RVJS THOMPSON.

Uni7.•ersity of Pittsburgh Latv
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.•"Perhaps the most significant advahce in the modern science of law is
the change from the analytical -to the functional standpoint. For the jurist
of today, the world over, seeks to discover and -to ponder· the actnal social
effects of legal institutions and legal doctrines. • • • Men no longer think in
closed systeIIJs nor seek to foreclose change by rigid postulates from which
alt'dctails are·to be inevitable lq;Pcal deductions." Dean Pound, "Anachroni~ms in Law," address delivered before the Conference of the Bar Association Delegates, at the 1917 meeting of the American Bar Association. 3 JL
Ax. Jun.~ 142-·

